InSEKurity of the Week (CW46/2026): OpenSSH "SSHole" Password Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-123158)
On musl-based Linux such as Alpine, sshd without PAM accepts any password of 257 to 1024 bytes for accounts that have no password at all. CVSS 8.1, fixed in OpenSSH 10.6p2, exploited within two days and in CISA KEV since November 9, 2026.
This week in our InSEKurity of the Week series: the most widely deployed remote administration tool on the planet. On November 5, 2026, the OpenSSH project shipped Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2 to close CVE-2026-123158, nicknamed “SSHole” (also written *sshole). On Linux systems that use the musl C library and run sshd without PAM — the default on Alpine Linux — an unauthenticated attacker can log in to accounts that have no password at all by sending any password between 257 and 1024 bytes. CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9.
There is no memory corruption and no cryptography being broken here. Three decisions, each reasonable on its own and made years apart, line up: Unix has used * in the password field to mean “no password can ever match” since 1980; musl’s crypt() has returned the string "*" as its error value since 2012; and since 2016, sshd borrows another account’s salt when it hashes a password for an account without a usable hash. Send a password that is too long for musl, and crypt() returns "*" — which is exactly what is stored for the account. sshd compares the two, sees a match, and lets the attacker in.
The scope is narrow — glibc distributions like Debian, Ubuntu and RHEL are not affected — but the narrow part is everywhere: Alpine is a common base for container images, and musl is a popular C library choice in embedded build systems such as Buildroot and Yocto. GreyNoise saw the first successful exploitation less than 40 hours after the fix was published.
🚨 Summary
- CVE ID: CVE-2026-123158 — “OpenBSD OpenSSH Unexpected Status Code or Return Value Vulnerability” (CISA KEV); nickname SSHole /
*sshole - CVSS 3.1 Score: 8.1 High, vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H(CNA: MITRE) - CWE: CWE-394: Unexpected Status Code or Return Value (CVE record and NVD); Red Hat lists CWE-303: Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm
- Vendor Advisory: OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes (2026-11-05) and Alpine Linux advisory (2026-11-05)
- Affected Software: sshd in Portable OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux, linked against musl libc, without PAM — most prominently Alpine Linux’s
openssh-serverpackage; also musl-based builds from Buildroot, Yocto and similar embedded toolchains that ship OpenSSH - Not Affected: glibc-based distributions (Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL and derivatives),
UsePAM yes,PasswordAuthentication no, OpenBSD, Dropbear - Attack Vector: Network — SSH password authentication against TCP port 22 (or wherever
sshdlistens) - Authentication Required: None
- Preconditions: password authentication enabled (the default), at least one account whose password field is exactly
*, and at least one account with a$5$or$6$password hash - Impact: Interactive shell as the passwordless account — on Alpine’s official cloud images, the
alpineuser, which has passwordlessdoasand therefore leads straight to root - Patch Status: Available — OpenSSH 10.6p2; Alpine backported the fix to every branch from 3.16 to edge
- Published: 2026-11-05
- Exploitation Status: Actively exploited — public proof-of-concept code since 2026-11-05, first successful exploitation observed by GreyNoise on 2026-11-07
- CISA KEV: Listed since 2026-11-09; federal due date 2026-11-12
🖥️ What is OpenSSH?
OpenSSH is the reference implementation of the Secure Shell protocol and is developed by the OpenBSD project. Its Portable edition brings it to Linux, the BSDs, macOS and countless embedded systems. If a server, a router, a NAS or a container can be administered over SSH, the software answering on port 22 is very likely OpenSSH. It is so ubiquitous that most organisations do not consider it a product at all — it is simply “SSH”.
CVE-2026-123158 is not a flaw in OpenSSH everywhere, but in one specific combination: OpenSSH plus musl libc plus no PAM. That combination is the default on Alpine Linux, a minimal distribution prized for its tiny footprint and one of the most popular bases for container images. musl is also a supported and frequently chosen C library in embedded build systems such as Buildroot and Yocto, which is how the same combination ends up in network appliances, industrial controllers and medical devices.
Typical Use Cases
- Container images that run
sshd— SFTP drop boxes, Git servers, CI build agents, jump hosts and “debug” containers - Alpine virtual machines and cloud instances, including Alpine’s official AWS and Azure images
- Bastion and jump hosts built on Alpine because it is small and easy to harden
- Embedded and IoT devices built with Buildroot or Yocto: gateways, routers, PLCs, medical devices
- Self-hosted PaaS and developer platforms that ship SSH containers for deployments or remote access
A “Hardened” Baseline That Backfires
The uncomfortable part of SSHole is who is affected. A minimal musl image, no PAM, key-only service accounts locked with * — that is exactly what a hardening guide for an embedded device or a slim container would recommend. Medcrypt, which reproduced the issue independently on a stock Yocto image, called it a common “hardened” embedded baseline on the oss-security mailing list. The accounts that are supposed to be unreachable by password are precisely the ones that open up.
🔍 Technical Analysis
Vulnerability Description
When a client authenticates with a password and PAM is not in use, sshd calls sys_auth_passwd() in auth-passwd.c. That function fetches the account’s stored hash, hashes the submitted password with crypt(), and accepts the login if the two strings are identical.
For an account whose password field is * (or another one-character value), there is no real salt to hash with. In that case sshd asks xcrypt() to pick one, and pick_salt() in openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c borrows the hash prefix of the first account it finds with a $...$ hash — for example $6$<salt>$ from a user with a real SHA-512 password. This behaviour was introduced in 2016 to fix a username enumeration via timing (CVE-2016-6210): hashing every password with a realistic algorithm makes valid and invalid accounts take the same time.
On glibc, crypt() would simply compute a SHA-512 hash, which never equals *. On musl, SHA-256 and SHA-512 crypt refuse keys longer than 256 bytes (KEY_MAX in crypt_sha256.c / crypt_sha512.c, added in 2012 as DoS protection), and on failure musl returns the string "*" rather than NULL. sshd then compares "*" with the stored "*" — and they match.
sshd itself caps passwords at 1024 bytes (MAX_PASSWORD_LEN), which is where the published range of 257 to 1024 bytes comes from.
Root Cause Analysis
*as “no password”. Unix has used a single*in the password field to mark accounts that must never accept a password since at least 3BSD (1980). Key-only users, service accounts and — since Alpine 3.16 (2022) —rooton Alpine base images carry it.- musl’s in-band error value. Since 2012, musl’s
crypt()returns"*"(or"x"if the setting itself starts with*) on failure instead ofNULL. The design is deliberate: a returned"*"can never equal a valid hash. It only becomes dangerous when the stored “hash” is itself*. - Salt borrowing for fake hashes.
sys_auth_passwd()only uses the stored value as the salt if it is at least two characters long (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]). For*, it passesNULL, andpick_salt()substitutes a$5$/$6$salt from another account. That is why at least one account with a real SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash must exist: with no such account, the salt falls back toxx(classic DES), which does not fail on long passwords. - No sanity check on the stored hash. Before 10.6p2,
sshdcompared thecrypt()result with whatever was stored, without asking whether a one-character string could possibly be a real hash. - A pointer into libc’s static buffer.
shadow_pw()returned a pointer into the static buffer of musl’sgetspnam(), andpick_salt()— which callsshadow_pw()for other accounts and then wipes the value withexplicit_bzero()— overwrites that same buffer. Our reading of the pre-fix source: on the first password attempt in a connection, the target’s stored value is clobbered while the salt is being picked, so the comparison fails. The salt is then cached in astaticvariable, so on the second attemptpick_salt()returns immediately, the stored*stays intact, and the over-long password matches. This matches the “two-attempt requirement” Medcrypt describes and IONIX’s note that public proofs-of-concept use two password attempts in one connection.
OpenSSH says it does not consider the root cause to be within OpenSSH, “but we are well equipped to avoid it”.
Attack Vector
# ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY -- logic flow reconstructed from the OpenSSH source before 10.6p2
# and the public write-ups; NOT a functional exploit.
Attacker sshd (musl, no PAM, PasswordAuthentication yes)
-------- ------------------------------------------------
1. connect to port 22, user "deploy" /etc/shadow: deploy:*:... (key-only user)
alice:$6$Ab..$ (real password)
2. password attempt #1 (any value) ---> sys_auth_passwd(): stored "*" is too short to be
a salt -> xcrypt(pw, NULL) -> pick_salt()
-> borrows "$6$Ab..$" from alice, caches it
-> comparison fails ("Permission denied")
3. password attempt #2: ---> sys_auth_passwd(): stored "*"
"AAAA...AAAA" (257-1024 bytes) -> crypt("AAAA...", "$6$Ab..$")
-> musl: key > 256 bytes -> returns "*"
-> strcmp("*", "*") == 0
-> "Accepted password for deploy"
4. shell as "deploy"
|
v
5. on Alpine cloud images: user "alpine" + passwordless doas -> root
Two details matter for defenders:
- The username must be guessed, but not much. Targets are accounts with
*in the password field —alpineon Alpine’s cloud images, common key-only user names, and directory-service users. Locked accounts with!are not affected, becausecrypt()’s"*"does not match!. - Root is protected by a default — unless it was changed.
auth_password()rejects password logins for UID 0 unlessPermitRootLogin yesis set, so with OpenSSH’s defaultprohibit-password, root on Alpine is not directly reachable even though its field is*. Images that setPermitRootLogin yeslose that protection.
The Fix
The upstream commit 4353fdc43 (“avoid password authn bypass”) changes two things in auth-passwd.c and openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c:
sys_auth_passwd()only accepts a match if the stored hash is at least 4 characters long (MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN) —*can no longer match anything.shadow_pw()now returns a heap copy instead of a pointer into libc’s static buffer, sopick_salt()can no longer interfere with the value being compared.
The researcher’s repository notes that the patch applies to OpenSSH 7.3p1 and later — which is how Alpine could backport it to branches that keep their old version numbers.
Exploitation in the Wild
- 2026-11-05, 09:01 UTC — OpenSSH 10.6p2 released; the write-up at sshhole.com follows at 12:19 UTC, the first public exploit at 13:16 UTC (GreyNoise timeline).
- 2026-11-06 — Exploitation attempts begin, according to reporting by The Hacker News.
- 2026-11-07, 00:46 UTC — GreyNoise observes the first successful exploitation in its sensor network. Defused Cyber reports “a small amount of actors” targeting SSHole the same day.
- 2026-11-07 / 08 — A cluster GreyNoise tracks as GT10 runs reconnaissance, cloud metadata queries, attempts to read password hashes and root SSH keys, modifies
authorized_keysfor persistence, and deploys TAC Agent, a Python-based C2 agent. - 2026-11-09 — CISA adds CVE-2026-123158 to KEV with a three-day federal deadline.
- 2026-11-10 — The Hacker News cites Previdian (22 attempts from 14 unique IPs) and watchTowr, which reports the flaw being weaponized for botnet and cryptocurrency mining activity.
The volume is still small. GreyNoise counted 94.8 million SYN probes against port 22 since the fix, but only a handful of exploitation attempts. That is less reassuring than it sounds: SSH is encrypted, so network sensors cannot see the over-long password — GreyNoise identifies successful exploitation by the shell commands that follow.
Post-Exploitation Impact
- Interactive shell as a key-only or service account — the account that was supposed to be unreachable by password.
- Root on Alpine cloud images — the
alpineuser has passwordlessdoas. - Persistence via new keys in
authorized_keys, which survive the patch. - Credential theft — password hashes, SSH host and user keys, and cloud instance credentials from the metadata service.
- Container and supply-chain abuse — CI agents and Git or SFTP containers often hold deployment keys, tokens and source code.
- Botnets and cryptominers — the first monetisation already observed by watchTowr.
- Embedded devices as a beachhead — on Yocto/Buildroot devices, a shell often means full control of the device and a foothold in OT or clinical networks that are rarely monitored.
📊 Impact Assessment
Immediate Impact
- Unauthenticated remote login on affected systems — no credentials, no user interaction, no prior foothold
- Accounts designed to be password-proof become password-open, with any password of 257 to 1024 bytes
- Patching the package is not enough — the running
sshdkeeps the old code until it is restarted, and existing backdoor keys stay in place
Affected Versions
Upstream, every Portable OpenSSH release before 10.6p2 is affected when built against musl without PAM. Because Alpine backported the fix, the version string alone does not tell you whether a host is fixed — compare the package release with this table:
| Alpine branch | Fixed openssh package |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 (EOL) | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 (EOL) | 9.6_p1-r3 |
| 3.18 (EOL) | 9.3_p2-r4 |
| 3.17 (EOL) | 9.1_p1-r7 |
| 3.16 (EOL) | 9.0_p1-r6 |
Source: Alpine Linux advisory. Alpine’s official cloud images built from 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, 3.24.4 and later include the fix. For Buildroot, Yocto and appliance firmware, check with the device vendor.
Affected Environments
- Alpine-based containers running
sshd— SFTP, Git, CI runners, jump and debug containers. Containers that do not runsshdare not affected. - Alpine VMs and cloud instances: Alpine’s tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 ship an
alpineuser with*and passwordlessdoas. They are safe on first boot, but become exploitable as soon as any$6$hash exists — for example after someone sets a console password. Images configured by cloud-init are protected as long as cloud-init writesPasswordAuthentication no(the default unless user-data setsssh_pwauth: true). - Alpine systems with
openssh-server-pambutUsePAMleft at its defaultno— in our test on Alpine 3.24, installing the PAM package alone did not enable PAM. - Embedded devices built with Buildroot or Yocto that use musl and OpenSSH. OpenWrt ships Dropbear by default, which is not affected; only builds that replaced it with OpenSSH are in scope.
- Hosts with directory-service users (sssd, winbind) that have no shadow entry.
Attacker Profiles
- Botnet and cryptomining operators — already observed; SSH has always been their favourite door.
- Initial access brokers collecting shells on cloud instances and CI infrastructure to resell.
- Supply-chain attackers interested in build agents, deployment keys and container registries.
- State-sponsored actors targeting network and embedded devices, where a musl-based appliance with OpenSSH is a long-lived, rarely monitored foothold.
🛡️ Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Priority 1)
1. Find out whether a host is exposed. Run these on the system itself (Alpine shown; on Alpine with openssh-server-pam, use /usr/sbin/sshd.pam instead of sshd).
# Which sshd package and release is installed? Compare the release with the table above.
apk list -I 'openssh-server*'
# Is sshd linked against musl? (A line containing "ld-musl" means yes.)
ldd /usr/sbin/sshd
# Effective configuration. On builds without PAM support there is no "usepam" line at all.
sshd -T | grep -i -E '^(usepam|passwordauthentication|permitrootlogin) '
# Accounts with exactly "*" (potential targets) and accounts with a $5$/$6$ hash (salt donors).
# Both must exist for the bypass to work.
awk -F: '$2 == "*" {print "star:", $1} $2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/ {print "hash:", $1}' /etc/shadow
From the outside, you can check which authentication methods a server offers without logging in. The user name does not need to exist. After mitigation, password must no longer appear in the list:
# Lists the methods the server still accepts, e.g. "publickey,password,keyboard-interactive"
ssh -o PreferredAuthentications=none -o PubkeyAuthentication=no -o BatchMode=yes \
-v user@your-host 2>&1 | grep 'can continue'
For container hosts, list the sshd packages in every running container:
# Prints each running container's name and any installed openssh-server package (Alpine-based only)
for c in $(docker ps -q); do
echo "== $(docker inspect -f '{{.Name}}' "$c")"
docker exec "$c" sh -c 'apk list -I "openssh-server*" 2>/dev/null'
done
2. Update and restart sshd. Upgrading the package does not replace the running daemon.
# Alpine: update the package index and upgrade all packages, then restart sshd (OpenRC)
apk upgrade -U -a
rc-service sshd restart
For containers, rebuild the image from a fixed base (alpine:3.24.4 or a refreshed tag of your branch) and redeploy — patching a running container is lost on the next restart. For appliances and embedded devices, apply the vendor’s firmware update.
3. If you cannot update right now, disable password authentication. Make sure your SSH key works and keep a session open before you do this. These are the commands from the Alpine advisory; they add a drop-in, flip any existing yes in sshd_config (keeping a .bak copy), validate the configuration and restart:
mkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
echo 'PasswordAuthentication no' > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf
sed -i.bak -e '1i PasswordAuthentication no' \
-e 's/^\(\s*PasswordAuthentication[^y#]*\)yes/\1no/i' \
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
# Only restart if the configuration is valid, then confirm the effective setting is "no"
sshd -t && rc-service sshd restart
sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication
Check Match blocks too — a PasswordAuthentication yes inside a Match block re-enables passwords for the users or addresses it matches. To roll back, delete /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf and restore /etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak.
An alternative is to lock the target accounts with ! instead of *, but this is easy to miss for one account — disabling password authentication closes the issue completely.
Detection Measures
There is no network signature: the over-long password travels inside the encrypted SSH session. Detection has to happen on the host.
# 1. Successful password logins to accounts that have NO password ("*" in /etc/shadow).
# On Alpine, syslog writes to /var/log/messages. Any hit means: treat the host as compromised.
for u in $(awk -F: '$2 == "*" {print $1}' /etc/shadow); do
grep -E "Accepted password for $u from" /var/log/messages
done
# 2. All successful password logins -- on key-only hosts, every line here is suspicious
grep -E 'Accepted password for' /var/log/messages
# 3. Privilege escalation via doas after such a login (Alpine cloud images)
grep -E 'doas' /var/log/messages
# Reference file with the publication time of the fix (BusyBox find on Alpine has no -newermt)
touch -d '2026-11-05 00:00:00' /tmp/sshole-ref
# 4. Persistence: authorized_keys files changed since the fix was published
find / -xdev -name authorized_keys -newer /tmp/sshole-ref -exec ls -l {} + 2>/dev/null
# 5. Account databases: when were they last modified?
stat -c '%y %n' /etc/passwd /etc/shadow /etc/group
# 6. Startup scripts and periodic jobs added or changed since then
# (GreyNoise saw attackers install a startup service)
find /etc/init.d /etc/local.d /etc/periodic -type f -newer /tmp/sshole-ref -exec ls -l {} + 2>/dev/null
Users from directory services (sssd, winbind) do not appear in /etc/shadow, so also review Accepted password for entries for those accounts. If you find a hit, or cannot rule one out: isolate the host, preserve the logs, rotate every key and credential that was reachable from it — including cloud instance roles — and rebuild it rather than cleaning it in place.
Long-term Security Improvements
- Disable password authentication on every SSH server that does not strictly need it. Keys or certificates remove this entire class of bug.
- Make PAM a conscious decision. On Alpine, if you install
openssh-server-pam, setUsePAM yesexplicitly — the default isno. - Lock accounts with
!, not*, in your own images and build recipes, and keep at least the defaultsPermitRootLogin prohibit-password(orno). - Do not run
sshdin containers unless it is the purpose of the container. Usedocker exec/kubectl execfor debugging. - Keep SSH off the internet. Put management access behind a VPN or bastion with allowlists.
- Track libc in your SBOM. “Is it musl or glibc?” decided whether you were affected this week. Embedded vendors should be able to answer that for every product.
- Monitor host authentication logs centrally and alert on password logins to accounts that should be key-only.
⚠️ Why is this Critical?
- Confirmed exploitation within two days — public exploit on release day, first compromise less than 40 hours later, CISA KEV with a three-day deadline.
- Pre-authentication on SSH — the one service exposed on nearly every server and device.
- It hits hardened systems — minimal musl images with key-only accounts are exactly the configurations meant to be safe.
- Containers and embedded devices are hard to patch — images must be rebuilt, firmware must be shipped, and many devices never get either.
- Invisible on the wire — network sensors cannot see the over-long password.
- Version numbers lie — with backported fixes,
ssh -Vdoes not tell you whether a host is safe.
📅 Timeline and Disclosure
- 1980 — 3BSD uses
*in/etc/passwdfor accounts without a valid password. - 2012 — musl starts returning
"*"fromcrypt()on failure and adds the 256-byte key limit to SHA-256/SHA-512 crypt. - 2016 — OpenSSH borrows other accounts’ salts for fake password hashes (fix for CVE-2016-6210).
- 2022 — Alpine 3.16 changes
root’s password field from!to*. - 2026-10-06 — OpenSSH 10.6/10.6p1 released.
- 2026-11-04 — Fix committed upstream (
4353fdc43, “avoid password authn bypass”). - 2026-11-05 — OpenSSH 10.6p2 and fixed Alpine packages released; write-up by Özgün Kültekin (Wakefield) published; first public exploit; CVE-2026-123158 published.
- 2026-11-07 — First successful exploitation observed by GreyNoise.
- 2026-11-09 — CISA adds CVE-2026-123158 to the KEV catalog; Medcrypt reports reproduction on stock Yocto on oss-security.
- 2026-11-12 — Remediation due date for US federal civilian agencies.
📚 Resources and References
- OpenSSH — Release notes, OpenSSH 10.6p2
- OpenSSH Portable — commit 4353fdc43: avoid password authn bypass
- Alpine Linux — OpenSSH password authentication bypass
- NVD — CVE-2026-123158
- MITRE CVE — CVE-2026-123158
- CWE-394: Unexpected Status Code or Return Value
- CISA — Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CVE-2026-123158)
- Red Hat — CVE-2026-123158
🤝 SEKurity Supports You
SSHole is a reminder that “secure by default” is a property of a whole system, not of its parts. musl’s error value is safe, OpenSSH’s timing protection is sensible, and * has meant “no password” for 46 years — together, they turn a key-only account into one that accepts a string of As. No scanner would have flagged any of those three decisions on its own.
The useful questions this week are concrete. How many of your containers run sshd, and on which base image? Which of your appliances and embedded devices are built on musl, and does the vendor know? Is password authentication enabled anywhere it does not need to be? Would anyone notice a password login to an account that is only supposed to use keys?
We look at your infrastructure the way attackers do — from the internet, from inside the network, and from inside a container or device — and find the combinations that turn individually reasonable configurations into a way in. If your container platform or your embedded products have never had that look, now is a good time.
Our Services
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The security of your servers, containers and devices is our drive.
Sources
- OpenSSH — Release notes — 10.6p2 release date (2026-11-05), password authentication bypass on Linux systems built without PAM, reporter credit; 10.6p1 release date
- OpenSSH Portable — commit 4353fdc43 — fix diff (
MIN_PASSWORD_HASH_LEN, heap copies inshadow_pw()), commit message; pre-fix source ofsys_auth_passwd(),auth_password(),pick_salt()andMAX_PASSWORD_LENreviewed at parent commit3c6ec4c63 - musl libc — crypt_sha512.c and crypt_sha256.c —
KEY_MAX 256and"*"error return - Alpine Linux — OpenSSH password authentication bypass — affected configurations, fixed package versions per branch, tiny-cloud and cloud-init notes, update and mitigation commands, compromise checks
- sshhole.com and GitHub — oz9un/sshole — original write-up by Özgün Kültekin: history of
*, musl commits, salt borrowing, affected platforms, patch applicability to 7.3p1+ - OpenCVE — CVE-2026-123158 — CVE description, CVSS vector, CWE, publication date, affected version data, KEV dates
- CISA — CISA Adds Four Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog (2026-11-09) — KEV addition
- GreyNoise — SSHole exploitation events — disclosure and exploitation timeline, scanning funnel, GT10 activity, TAC Agent
- The Hacker News — CISA Warns of Active Exploitation of OpenSSH, GPUStack, FreeSWITCH, and IBM Flaws — KEV deadline, Previdian, Defused Cyber, GreyNoise and watchTowr observations
- Cloudflare Radar — *sshole: OpenSSH password bypass on musl Linux — conditions, cloud-init and tiny-cloud details, backport caveat for version checks
- OX Security — OpenSSH Password Authentication Bypass on Alpine Linux — conditions, password length range, Alpine fixed packages
- oss-security — Re: “sshole” (Medcrypt, 2026-11-09) — independent reproduction on stock Yocto, two-attempt requirement
- IONIX — CVE-2026-123158 threat center — two password attempts in one connection, external authentication-method check
- Red Hat — CVE-2026-123158 — Red Hat products not affected (glibc and PAM)
- OpenWrt — Dropbear configuration — Dropbear as OpenWrt’s SSH server
- OpenBSD — sshd_config(5) and sshd(8) —
PasswordAuthentication,PermitRootLogindefault,Match,sshd -t/sshd -T - Alpine Linux apk-tools — apk-list(8) —
apk list -I - EntryZero — Top 5 Hacker-relevant Vulnerabilities (weekly briefing) — weekly vulnerability briefing consulted for topic selection
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SEKurity Team
Offensive Security Experts
The SEKurity GmbH team consists of experienced penetration testers, security researchers, and cybersecurity consultants. Under the motto 'Your Trusted Adversaries', we support organizations in evaluating their IT security from an attacker's perspective and improving it.
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